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Contemporary populist parties typically claim that the state has been turned into a ‘swamp’ 
by the mainstream political elites: a swamp that can only be drained by the new champions 
of the comparatively ‘pure’ people. This juxtaposition of corrupt elites and betrayed masses 
is arguably the defining mode of populism1 so how can we explain the renewed resonance of 
that idea? How is it that we have moved from a relatively consensual post-war conception of 
the state as the primary force of social integration to the widespread conception that the 
state is a vehicle of betrayal? 
 
The crisis of democracy in advanced capitalist states is deeply paradoxical. Europe and 
North America are wealthier than ever and yet more politically unstable, with more votes 
accruing to the political extremes than at any time since the 1930s.Critical scholars have 
long predicted a crisis but they have depicted the problem in terms of governments 
increasingly struggling to satisfy social versus business needs and failing, as if the state 
itself was a consistently neutral arbiter.2 Thus Streeck argues that governments have worked 
through a number of strategies to manage the sharpening trade-off between the 
achievement of economic growth and social justice only to see each of these strategies run 
out of steam: they began with a tolerance of inflation in the 1970s, moved onto the 
accumulation of public debt in the 1980s and - via financialisation - into the active 
encouragement of private debt by the 1990s,3 so-called ‘privatised Keynesianism’.4  
 
But something far more radical has simultaneously been taking place through the latter era, 
namely the transformation of the state itself via privatization, outsourcing, internal 
managerialism and agencification, the rejection of interventionist industrial policies and the 
concomitant development of quasi-markets in welfare provision, all within a context of 
liberalizing tax regimes. It is surely no coincidence that the countries that have seen the 
biggest rebellions against the mainstream elites are those that went furthest in transforming 
their states but also where a pro-market social democratic left was most implicated in driving 
that process.  
 
The problem is that very few of these reforms have worked in the terms by which they were 
justified. Moreover, the increased porosity of state structures to business involvement - to 
levels unprecedented in the era of universal suffrage – has enabled an upsurge in political 
corruption in all the states adopting these changes, albeit to varying degrees. What Europe 
and North America have experienced in practice are varieties of state failure combined with 
corruption scandals that create the most damaging possible scenario: one in which the 
mainstream political elites are seen to abuse the powers of the state for private gain while 
simultaneously withdrawing its protections from the public.  
 
Behind each story of increasingly bipartisan state reforms was a governmental determination 
to manage the intensifying pressure on public finances. But in practice the failures of these 
reforms have only exacerbated the fiscal and social tensions of de-industrialization already 
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emerging in the 1970s which were then amplified by the liberalisation of capital movements 
through the 1980s: pressures experienced as a radical shock in post-Communist Europe but 
as an intensifying challenge in Western capitalist states. The transformation of the state was 
typically begun in good faith and according to prevailing liberalising orthodoxies. But many of 
the assumptions behind these newly radicalised orthodoxies proved flawed, and not just in 
their internal theoretical logic but in the failure to anticipate what would happen when 
marketization could only be partially applied, as was bound to be the case in real world 
conditions. The necessary conditions for competitive and hence efficient markets are 
remarkably extensive and strict: their natural existence is rare and their near approximation 
has historically required the active interventions of the state. Highly incomplete markets in 
the meantime can produce unexpected and socially perverse outcomes, as the cases below 
show. The fantasy pushed by so-called ‘supply-side’ economists - that pure markets could 
exist if only the state would ‘get out of the way’ - has nevertheless persisted,5 and when the 
global financial crisis threw these wider reform failures into relief mainstream political elites 
proved unwilling to acknowledge the magnitude of the crisis for at least two reasons. Firstly, 
because they shared responsibility for the failed policies but also because of the continuing 
absence of any alternative developmental model beyond the still prevailing utopia of 
eventual market ‘completion’. The remainder of this essay offers a brief illustration of state 
failure in the four most surprising cases of the populist wave, namely in Hungary, Poland, the 
UK and the US: four former trailblazers at the historical leading edge of democracy.  
 
Poland and Hungary were in the vanguard of the anti-communist revolutions of 1989 and 
had the strongest social basis for stable and ‘mainstream’ electoral competition. In the mid-
2000s Hungary and Poland had the highest proportion of voters who identified themselves 
as social democrats in Central Europe,6 i.e. on a par with Swedish rates. Why was it then 
that a growing segment, including former leftist voters, became susceptible to the idea ‘that 
the nation cannot be in opposition’, and turned from narratives that had championed the 
nation’s place within the new Europe towards those that berated the EU as an oppressive 
force? Put at its simplest: both countries have seen an intensifying political crisis because of 
the necessarily partial nature of liberalisation: because really-existing communist production 
regimes could not be turned into textbook liberal production regimes in practice and 
necessarily partial liberalization created particular difficulties. Both Hungary and Poland 
actually developed hybrid political economies: highly liberalised and open economies with 
critically missing liberal institutions such as domestic sources of business credit, dispersed 
corporate ownership or venture capital. This path-dependent lack of internal institutions that 
efficiently complement each other has led to highly polarising socio-economic outcomes 
made worse by the retreating state, e.g. low unemployment protections in contexts of weakly 
dynamic labour markets and weak innovation capacity unimproved by state assistance - in 
stark contrast to high state investment in research in the USA, for example. 
 
The social contract offered in the early 1990s in both Hungary and Poland was that a 
minimum income guarantee would be provided to the most vulnerable – pensioners and the 
unemployed – to forestall a backlash against marketization. This guarantee was predicated 
on the gamble that renewed economic growth would make the new welfare contract 
sustainable. But despite being the fastest and most consistently growing economy in the 
region Poland’s social contract liabilities, its pension liabilities in particular, would prove both 
fiscally and politically sticky. By 2000 Poland was spending far more than the OECD average 
on income transfers and twice the average on disability pensions.7 The increasing rigidity in 
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Poland’s public spending effectively crowded out the Polish state’s ability to adjust its welfare 
system to insure its population against the new social risks of globalisation, and this despite 
successive governments cutting back entitlements to unemployment benefits to some of the 
lowest levels in the OECD. Poland has a politically polarising structure of poverty as a result, 
in which it already has British rates of relative poverty but at Chilean income levels, and 
those in poverty are the young, those with large families, and those in rural areas.8 The 
Polish elderly meanwhile are relatively well off and politically mobilised, as witnessed by the 
massive public demonstrations against raising the pension age: an essential measure which 
the populist Law and Justice promptly reversed when returned to power in 2015.  
 
As its new developmental challenges emerged Poland wrestled with persistent tensions on 
the supply side of its economy. Its dependence on foreign economic investment (though 
lower than elsewhere in the region) constrained successive governments’ room to make its 
institutional regime more coherent. For example, the region-wide tax competition for foreign 
investment meant that Poland has steadily reduced its corporate and personal income tax 
rates but its ongoing welfare liabilities forced the persistent burden of taxation to be shifted 
onto VAT and more damagingly still, onto labour. The practical result has been an 
exceptionally high tax wedge on labour that has stalled domestic employment and pushed 
employers towards the use of temporary contracts, so that Poland now has the highest 
number of 15-24 years-olds on temporary contracts in Europe: a staggering 69% by 2013.9 
The neo-classical economics on which transition economics was based operated from 
deductive ‘ceteris paribus’ assumptions that implied that any liberalising reform created 
efficiency gains: but the really existing economies had ‘cetera’ that were far more 
dynamically problematic. 
 
A similar unintended consequence of the radical opening of Poland’s economy was the 
incompatibility of the needs of the emerging domestic market for business credit and the 
severe risk aversion of Poland’s internationalised banking sector to lend to Polish 
businesses. Poland’s small and medium sized enterprise have been starved of credit as 
international banks focused on lending to home country multi-national companies and the 
lucrative domestic mortgage and retail markets. It hasn’t helped, politically, that the old EU 
member states had insisted that this region internationalise its banking system as an article 
of liberal faith while assiduously rejecting this option themselves.10 However, the more 
salient political point is that the Blairite left in Poland is now as associated as the neo-liberal 
right with reforms that seemed to favour external constituencies at the expense of those 
domestic workers not employed within the foreign direct investment sector. Miller’s Social 
Democratic government had lowered the corporate rate to 19% as part of its 2004 reforms, 
outdoing the proposals of even the radically neo-liberal Leszek Balcerowicz.11 
 
The underlying dichotomy between the changing economic production regime and 
social justice is perhaps even better illustrated by the Hungarian story which 
demonstrates the ‘damned if you do, damned if you don’t’ socio-economic experience 
of contemporary democratic governments in search of social cohesion. Successive 
Hungarian governments liberalised their tax regimes and opened their economy to 
foreign direct investment but maintained not just the minimal social contract for the 
most vulnerable but also relatively high social investment. They aimed to create a 
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66.   
virtuous circle of human capital investment and higher valued-added production. But 
again the result was an exceptionally severe fiscal crisis when sufficient growth failed 
to materialise.  
 
The Hungarian Socialist Party had tried to combine radical liberalisation with sustained 
state spending on education, training and public employment and Fidesz’s first 
administration had offered mortgage subsidies and failed to reduce pension liabilities. 
As in Poland the result was the shifting of a high tax burden onto labour and 
employment and rising public debt to a cumulatively ungovernable level. Hungary 
increasingly combined the lowest employment rate in Europe with one of the highest 
tax wedges on labour and with the highest public spending overall of the Visegrád 
states. By 2006 this meant French levels of public spending at Polish levels of per 
capita income. When coupled with a post-2007 crisis in privately held foreign the last 
Hungarian Socialist government was left with nowhere to go but to unprecedented 
austerity measures. By 2010, given corruption scandals and public knowledge that the 
HSP had misrepresented the real condition of public finances it had squandered public 
trust.12 Orban’s Fidesz duly won on a promise of ‘no austerity’, only to implement 
exactly that alongside a shift to constitutional lock-in and increasingly concerted crony-
state capitalism. 
 
The Hungarian and Polish political systems were thus confronted with the challenge of 
maintaining popular legitimacy for radical reform in the face of socially exclusive 
modes of economic growth and rising fiscal pressure for ever-deeper public spending 
cuts. This was essentially the Western capitalist experience of de-industrialisation 
concentrated into a shorter time span and at the points where democracy’s merits had 
still to be proved. In both cases the social democratic left saw the shattering of their 
electoral support as the parties (first in Poland, then in Hungary) appeared to vacate 
the leftist socio-economic space entirely. But the irony is terrible: these former young 
communist technocrats had become the region’s most Blairite, pro-market social 
democratic parties in order to demonstrate their liberal virtue! 
 
So what similarities exist between the political economic gamble of Post-Communist Central 
Europe and the rise of populism in already highly liberalised advanced capitalist economies 
such as the USA and UK? In the latter cases the evidence is again of a deepening crisis of 
the state’s capacity to act effectively in the public interest, and the association of that crisis 
with the social democratic left as much as the more traditionally pro-market right. To take the 
case of the USA, the argument has been made since the beginning of the global financial 
crisis that a coalition of organized big business and increasingly co-opted political elites had 
replaced the post-war political consensus in which ideologically competing parties strove to 
support the American middle class and to enable the upward mobility of the poorest into that 
class. The phenomenal rise in business lobbying and recently uncapped corporate party 
funding in the US are described as spawning a ‘predator state’13 whose main function is to 
divert public money to private hands and as ‘winner takes all politics’14 in which large 
corporations concertedly intervene in politics to manage institutional and regulatory changes 
to their overwhelming advantage. A second-wave literature has duly begun on how the 
various dimensions of corporate state or ‘regulatory’ capture already are, or can be limited.15  
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The key to understanding the American case is the unprecedented undermining of 
opportunities for social mobility within a relatively liberal economy: America’s historical social 
contract. As the tax expert James Henry noted, by 2013 some 22 per cent of all US children 
were living in poverty, the highest rate since the 1960s, and overall real per capita household 
incomes have stagnated since the 1980s, so that all of the increased income generated by 
the post 2009 recovery was consumed by the top 1 per cent. In the meantime “government 
assistance for the poor and the unemployed, as well as funding for public investments in 
education, roads, hospitals and schools was starved for funding.” Henry concludes that this 
“was a policy-made phenomenon”16 and as such it cannot be surprising that such outcomes 
have proved peculiarly crippling to the credibility of the mainstream parties. 
 
This un-mandated breach of the prevailing social contract is repeated in the UK. It is actually 
the UK which initiated the era of hybridising state reforms with Margaret Thatcher’s drive 
towards a more business-oriented approach to government preceding similar moves in the 
US, Canada and New Zealand.17 Launched on the promise of ‘better government for less 
money’ these leading edge reforms were based on the idea that not only should the 
economy be liberalised but the state itself should be opened up directly to business 
involvement in both policy-making and delivery. The Blaire New Labour and New Democrat 
left then embraced these reform ideas as a new way to combine wealth creation with greater 
efficiency and responsiveness in public service provision. In practice, however, these 
experiments have produced contrary results. In the UK reported administration costs have 
risen by 40 per cent in constant prices, despite a third of civil service numbers being cut over 
the same thirty year period, whilst total public spending over the same period has doubled. 
Complaints and judicial challenges have soared and running costs have been driven up in 
the outsourced domains.18  
  
The hybridised UK state has proved more expensive and, as the now sizeable public 
administration and policy literatures attests, largely less efficient, resulting in poorer social, 
economic and political outcomes. Hybridisation nevertheless continues to proliferate not just 
in the UK but globally and it is still actively encouraged by the World Bank, OECD and EU as 
the route to greater efficiency despite the mounting evidence to the contrary. (The risks of 
outsourcing, moreover, are starkest in the most poorly regulated states. In the Czech 
Republic the value of public contracts awarded through opaque, non-tendered channels 
between 2006 and 2010 is estimated at 276 billion crowns or roughly one-fifth of the current 
national debt: the Republic is a cautionary tale of how neo-liberalism can be instrumentalised 
by political elites for private gain.19) This deepening of state hybridization in the face of 
chronically poor results is profoundly dangerous because it creates an irreconcilable tension 
between our basic norms of democracy, dependent as these are on state autonomy, and the 
increasing permeation of that state authority by private businesses. Again, it is hard to 
imagine a process more productive of the idea that political elites are in collusion with 
business at the expense of the public interest. Moreover this increasing role for private 
businesses has typically been replicated throughout the wider state administration and its 
regulatory agencies. In the UK this has led to a level of administrative and informational 
fragmentation that rather than reducing bureaucracy has only radically complicated it, and 
exacerbated the so-called ‘principle-agent’ problems wherein the interests and information of 
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agents and the principles that delegate tasks to them potentially diverge. Thus, far from 
becoming cheaper this greater government complexity has necessarily increased the 
transaction costs involved. Flinders argues that institutional fragmentation has ended the 
capacity of UK central government to operate ‘meta-governance’ over state authority,20 and 
that authority is increasingly wielded by private hands.  
 
The theory of quasi-markets for welfare and public services21 was based on a focus on the 
end-user and provider market and analytically ignored the inalienable persistence of the 
state procurement market: inalienable, that is, given continued taxpayer funding for politically 
mandated public services. Theoretically speaking the idea of quasi-markets ran with the 
standard welfare economics that supported it, rooted as that was in the conventional 
preoccupation with possible trade-offs between equity of outcomes and the efficiency of 
processes. But the ideas behind quasi-markets ignored the contract and property rights 
theory that would have identified the still procuring state as doomed to be at the wrong end 
of chronically inadequate private service contracts owing to the complexity of most of the 
goods in question. The predictable outcome is ‘incomplete’ - essentially unfair - contracts in 
which the (state) buyer lacks the information of the (private) seller and hence is vulnerable to 
hold-up and opportunism. In practice the UK’s taxpayer funded quasi-markets are 
characterised by public service industry oligopolies with a tendency to sweat the guaranteed 
public funding while only producing perfunctory behaviour within hard to monitor contracts. 
This explains the higher costs, lower service quality and increased regulatory complexity of 
goods as pivotal to the public experience of the state as health, education and prison 
services. Ironically, quasi-market reforms of the capitalist state turn out to produce many of 
the pathologies of late communism’s mixed markets, including a regulatory reliance on 
incentive-distorting indicative planning and chronic gaming practices. And again the results 
are experienced by citizens, most notably those on lower and middle incomes, as the 
opposite of what they were promised. 
 
In the short term a cheering note is hard to find: it is not clear how this trend to social and 
political polarisation can be reversed without a radical shift in the political economic 
paradigm because our current production regimes offer up an increasingly divergent set of 
social interests. The knowledge economy encourages a dramatic shift in the dominant 
producer coalition landscape and its favoured welfare regime. There were distinct patterns in 
the Brexit vote and the US election of divergent voting preferences between the centres of 
the new knowledge economy – rooted in information and computer technology and services 
– versus those of the rural, industrial and mid-range technology economies. These trends 
support a worrying thesis,22 which is that there are increasing structural divisions in 
advanced capitalist economies between those higher educated voters who feel able to self-
insure in minimal or even failing state conditions and who prefer the flexibility of highly 
liberalised labour markets versus the rest, who have poor prospects in this system. There is 
a similar trend in the Central European economies fortunate enough to receive German-
dominated high quality investment in the complex manufacturing sector, where those 
employed within these new sectors typically have better prospects than those outside them, 
but the domestic state is impoverished as a developmental entity.  
 
So it is unclear where the new, consensual centre ground of public policy-making is to be 
found, and with it a legitimising role for the democratic state as a socially integrative force. 
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But historically we have accepted the authority of the state to act in any respect on the basis 
of its capacity to fulfil a social contract. As TH Marshall classically pointed out23, we have 
done so on a changing conceptual basis: that the state should defend our civic, our political, 
and latterly in the post-war era, our social rights. The thing is, that expectation still exists and 
while the ‘new’ social democrats of the 1990s may have successfully parsed the language of 
social equality into the language of social justice, the results of public policy have 
increasingly failed to resemble any such a thing, and many voters have reacted with 
understandable disgust. In the meantime the new populists promise economic and cultural 
protection: from Scandinavia to the USA they now outflank the social democrats on the left 
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